How much of a setback, then, is the murder? Abdul Sattar was the dashing, robed thirtysomething figure America could use as an example of what Sunnis can get if they turn against terrorists. His tribesmen were formed into security forces and paid salaries. He grew in stature to the point that he was allowed to meet George W. Bush when the president made his Labor Day visit to Anbar. The sheik died Thursday when, a U.S. military official told NEWSWEEK, a car parked near the entrance to the sheik’s large compound exploded as he passed by. His death could throw the movement into disarray.
That’s the story line, anyway. But nothing in Iraq, especially tribal politics, is that simple. Abdul Sattar was the leader of only one of several factions lining up with the U.S. military, and his influence was always questionable. He was a useful role model, but the other tribal leaders had made their own decisions to oppose Al Qaeda and its violent atrocities. They and their constituent tribe members saw two foreign forces on their turf, the United States and Al Qaeda. When Al Qaeda became too ruthless in its killings of tribe members who failed to support them and too brutal in its enforcement of fundamentalist Islam, the tribes sought the help of the other big force, the Americans. Abdul Sattar was one of the first to emerge and won the biggest public accolades. But Abdul Sattar, who even allies suspected of being a smuggler and opportunist in the great tradition of desert tribesmen, was hardly standing alone.
Abdul Sattar’s death could lead to jockeying and bloodshed among the tribes–but that might have happened anyway. It’s even plausible that he was killed with the help of competitors within his own movement. The death just highlights the tensions and dangers that already existed for a tribal alliance rife with divisions and shifting coalitions, based on a mixture of power, security and money.
Given America’s unpopularity in the region–and especially in Anbar–it’s hard to say there wasn’t a link between the timing of the killing and the very public meeting with Bush. Indeed, the Islamic State of Iraq, which today claimed responsibility for the assassination, warned that it had formed “special security committees” to trace and assassinate tribal leaders who helped the U.S. forces. “And let those who are left of the apostate and agent heads who are involved in the American project know that the swords of the mujahedin are after them,” the umbrella insurgent group, which includes Al Qaeda in Iraq, said in a statement issued to jihadi Web sites today and reported by the SITE Institute.
“He should never have met with Bush,” said a high-ranking U.S. Marine officer who acts as a liaison with friendly tribes in the region. “He was signing his own death warrant.” But there had been previous attempts on Abdul Sattar’s life, and many of his tribal allies–as well as his father–had already suffered similar deaths. Killers had been targeting Abdul Sattar for months and will continue to pursue others on that path, with the aid of betrayals by disgruntled associates. But that could just feed the anti-Al Qaeda sentiment and keep the movement going. “This is bigger than [Abdul Sattar]; it’s all the tribes,” said the Marine liaison.
If anything, danger is a constant in the Anbar tribal game. The future will likely be decided by other factors. The Shiite-led Iraqi government has slowly started to embrace the Anbar movement, bringing more tribesmen into the ranks of the salaried police forces and promising more than $100 million for reconstruction. Top leaders attended the funeral. With or without Abdul Sattar, the question will be whether the sheiks of Anbar think a deal with the United States and the Iraqi government promises them more of a future than they can get with someone else.
With Ranya Kadri in Amman.
